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Introduction 
 
The general adoption of austerity policies throughout the EU and in particular in the 
eurozone is having very adverse effects on the level of employment, on job and 
employment security and on working conditions. These effects are also highly 
differentiated, being especially intense in the countries facing sovereign debt crises. 
The following paper presents some evidence for the countries in question drawn 
primarily from the stability programmes and national reform programmes which 
member states are required to submit each year to the Commission. 
 
The present paper first gives a brief description of the new policy surveillance system 
in the eurozone. Then it is suggested that the macroeconomic policies adopted in the 
context of reinforced surveillance are incoherent. The implications of austerity 
policies for workers are discussed; young workers are clearly badly affected. Details 
are given of acute pressures on European social models in the economically weaker 
countries, taking Portugal, Greece and Ireland as examples. It is concluded that the 
new policy regime in the eurozone makes social dumping in effect the central social 
strategy in the monetary union. 
 
 
From Stability Pact to Surveillance Union 
 
EU leaders are perfectly correct to argue that institutional reforms are needed in the 
eurozone. The Stability Pact, intended to guarantee budgetary discipline and thus 
economic stability, failed in two ways: some countries, such as Spain and Ireland, 
suffered enormous crises in spite of their obeying the Stability Pact rules; others, such 
as Greece, clearly violated the rules continuously. However the response adopted by 
the EU ignores the fact that it was only these malfunctions – only the build-up of 
imbalances – which permitted the eurozone to achieve even the mediocre employment 
performance that it recorded1. 
In several ways EU authorities are preparing a post-crisis regime which will install a 
comprehensive tutelage over the weaker economies. Some of this is already apparent 
in the conditions imposed on crisis-struck countries, in particular Greece. In return for 
EFSF finance, Greece is required to make big changes which would normally depend 
on internal debate – such as privatisations and alterations to pension arrangements. A 
particularly worrying demand from the creditor authorities is the decentralisation of 
collective bargaining – an attempt to dismantle a social model which European law 
requires the EU to respect. 
As Habermas puts it, governments will be inspected every year to see whether “the 
level of debt, labour market deregulation, the system of social security, the health care 
system, wages in the public sector, the wage share, the rate of corporation tax and 
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 The European commission's Ameco database gives the growth of employment in the original 
eurozone (the first eleven countries plus Greece) between 1999 and 2007 as 13.7 million. But, of this 
total, two thirds, or 8.9 million, took place in the "periphery" – in Ireland, Greece, Spain, Italy and 
Portugal. 
much more correspond to the reckoning of the Council.” He could have pointed out 
that such surveillance will be of the weak by the strong.2 
 The rules of the “Growth and Stability Pact”, supposed to govern the budgetary 
policies of all EU members and to be obligatory for members of the eurozone, were 
based on the fallacious notion that, provided public sector deficits were limited, 
market forces would ensure a balanced development of the economy. In reality there 
developed very large current account deficits across the periphery which became 
impossible to finance after the crisis of 2008.3 
The financial crisis of 2008, provoking a rapid decline in private sector expenditures, 
necessitated substantial public sector injections around the world. The Commission 
had to recognise that much wider public sector deficits were needed temporarily, but 
already by 2009 it was demanding an early “exit” from these more supportive 
budgetary policies. At the same time it made proposals to make the Stability Pact 
rules on public sector borrowing and debt much more restrictive and to introduce new 
rules on macroeconomic “imbalances.” 
 
The official rationale for these changes is couched in terms of both “co-ordination” 
and “surveillance.” But they do nothing to promote co-ordination. Genuine co-
ordination would require firstly the specification of an overall macro policy for the 
eurozone and then the specification of differentiated national policies compatible with 
the overall macro stance. There is nothing of this in the proposed amendments. In 
reality, the only focus of these measures is on the surveillance of individual member 
states and, although this is not stated, the concern is only with the weaker member 
states to whose “indiscipline” the current crisis is attributed. Thus the whole package 
neglects the central problem of coordination – the huge imbalances in current 
accounts. 
 
The reform comprises six pieces of legislation, which have now passed through the 
European Parliament with very few changes. The first four tighten the requirements of 
the existing stability pact and its enforcement through the “excessive deficit 
procedure.” The other two introduce an “excessive imbalance procedure” which 
introduces similar legal constraints on other aspects of macroeconomic policy; they 
are obviously inspired by the fact that in Ireland and Spain crisis had nothing to do 
with public sector deficits but relates to capital inflows into the private sector. A brief 
description of this legislation is as follows: 
 
Tightening the Stability Pact: 
1. New definitions of the stability pact rules emphasise “excessive” levels of 
public debt as well as well as annual deficits; “discretionary” measures have 
to be taken to correct both and the speed of correction is specified. The only 
permitted exceptions have a strongly deregulatory character – a member state 
may run deficits to introduce a funded pension scheme, but not, for example, 
to finance a social housing programme. 
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 http://www.eurozine.com/articles/2011-08-26-habermas-en.html 
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 The rest of this section draws on the 2011 Euromemorandum discussion of Stability Pact Reforms, 
which was drafted by the present author. 
2. Stronger surveillance is to take place through the annual submission of 
stability programmes (including “structural reforms”) which must embody a 
medium-term budgetary objective to permit the Council to verify “prudent” 
fiscal policies. Even countries within the prescribed reference values must not 
increase public expenditure faster than GDP (thus any move by other 
countries towards Scandinavian social models becomes illegal). 
3. Reinforced penalties involve first compulsory deposits and then fines for 
eurozone members. Sanctions are to become more automatic since at many 
stages of the “excessive deficit procedure” a qualified majority in the Council 
will be needed to block penalties rather than to impose them.  
4. Member states must establish a satisfactory Budgetary Framework. This 
covers accounting systems, statistics, fiscal relations with regional and local 
government, forecasting practices (although the Commission’s own 
forecasting is less than impressive), budgetary procedures and “fiscal rules.” 
It is strongly recommended that the latter involve numerical limits, in spite of 
the repeated difficulties that such rules provoke, most recently with public 
finance in the US today (and no doubt Germany in the near future). 
 
The Excessive Imbalance Procedure: 
5. A scoreboard comprising “a limited number of economic and financial  
indicators” is to be established. “Indicative” thresholds will be set for these; if 
they are crossed investigative procedures may be launched; however there 
will not be an automatic alert; “economic judgement should ensure that all 
pieces of information, whether from the scoreboard or not, are put in 
perspective and become part of a comprehensive analysis”; this will identify 
member states to be subject to an “in-depth” review; this will involve 
“enhanced surveillance missions” and additional reporting by the member 
state concerned.4                       
6. Penalties do not follow right away. When excessive imbalances are definitely 
identified, “recommendations” will be made to the member state. Its response 
should be timely; should use “all available policy instruments” including 
fiscal and wage policies, labour markets, product and services markets and 
financial sector regulation. Eventually, however, if the response proves 
inadequate, sanctions – compulsory deposits and fines – will be imposed. 
Equity in penalties is to be assured by expressing these as a percentage of the 
GDP of the recalcitrant state. 
 
There is, of course, something absurd, even ridiculous, about this attempt to construct 
a juridical framework for macroeconomics, as anyone remotely familiar with that 
discipline will recognise. But the project is also sinister: it threatens to subject 
economically weaker members – and those alone – to a comprehensive tutelage 
involving every aspect of public policy. It is clear that the main indicators used will 
reflect so-called problems of “competitiveness.” Criticism in the EP and by some EU 
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 The indicators and their thresholds featuring in the scoreboard can be found in: European Economy, 
Occasional Paper 92, “Scoreboard for the surveillance of macroeconomic imbalances,” February 2012. 
As expected the emphasis is on external competitiveness and credit restriction. Only one indicator – 
unemployment – relates to the level of economic activity and the threshold for unemployment is set at 
10%. The scoreboard does include both current account surpluses and deficits – the threshold for the 
former is 6% of GDP, perfectly compatible with a continuation of mercantilist export promotion by 
Germany and its neighbours. Deficits, however, have a threshold of 4% of GDP. 
governments has led to the removal of explicit reference to wages in the legislation. 
But the wage levels and social models of the weaker states remain the targets of this 
project. 
 
Many types of “imbalance” will be outside the scope of the new procedures. These 
include: the coexistence of immense private fortunes with public sectors crippled by 
debt; the failure of wage growth in the EU to match productivity growth over now 
three decades; the remuneration of financial and corporate leaderships out of all 
proportion to typical incomes.  
  
The package is embedded in a reinforced set of administrative procedures known as 
the “European semester” which will take place in the first half of each year and lead 
to the definition of two sets of policies, one concerned with macroeconomic policy 
(the “stability programmes”) and the other (the “national reform programmes”) 
concerned with “structural reforms” in the Commission’s usual sense of reduced 
protection for employees, privatisations and deregulation of business. The first such 
exercise, which took place in 2011, indicates what is to be expected from these 
procedures: neither Commission recommendations for Germany nor Germany’s own 
programmes recognised any problem with its huge trade surplus. The entire process 
focuses on further fiscal consolidation, labour market “reforms,” and supply-side 
measures supposedly to promote growth by “large price and cost adjustments” in the 
weaker economies – in other words, by deflation.5 
 
 
Surveillance without Coordination 
 
The stability plans submitted by member states in the first European semester, 2011, 
seem dysfunctional in several respects. They were, firstly, completely unrealistic in 
the assumptions that were made about growth. The programmes put fiscal 
consolidation targets into a projection of macroeconomic developments for the period 
2011-14. The forecast GDP growth figures are given in Table 1. 
 
We can use actual GDP in 2010 (as reported on the Commission’s AMECO 
web-site) to derive implied GDP levels for each of the 17 and for the eurozone as 
a whole (in 2010 euros) and thus derive implied growth rates for the zone as a 
whole (Table 2).  
 
A first simple exercise is then to compare actual growth rates for 2011 with the 
SP forecasts (Table 3). This indicates that the latter were somewhat too 
optimistic for E-zone growth as a whole. Since German growth exceeded the 
forecast in its SP, this means that growth substantially undershot SP targets in 
most other countries. However, a divergence of 0.3% of GDP is hardly unusual 
in macroeconomic forecasting. 
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 Two further legislative proposals, the “two-pack,” would further increase the power of the 
Commission over national policies in the weaker states. Member state governments would be required 
to submit their draft budgets to the Commission before they were presented to national parliaments and 
the Commission could, in the case of heavily indebted states, require amendments. At present 
(September 2012) the legislation is still being discussed in the European Parliament.  
  
 
 
 
Table 1 
Growth Rates of GDP as per 2011 SPs  
 
2011 2012 2013 2014 
Belgium 2.0 2.3 2.1 2.3 
Germany 2.3 1.8 1.5 1.5 
Estonia 4.0 4.0 3.6 3.6 
Ireland 0.3 2.0 2.5 2.5 
Greece -3.5 0.8 2.1 2.1 
Spain 1.3 2.3 2.4 2.6 
France 2.0 2.3 2.3 2.3 
Italy 1.1 1.3 1.5 1.6 
Cyprus 1.5 2.5 2.7 3.0 
Luxembourg 3.2 3.5 3.7 4.0 
Malta 2.4 2.3 2.6 2.8 
Netherlands 1.8 1.5 1.3 1.3 
Austria 2.5 2.0 2.1 2.2 
Portugal -2.2 -1.8 1.2 2.5 
Slovenia 1.8 2.2 2.3 2.8 
Slovakia 3.4 4.8 4.8 4.8 
Finland 3.6 2.7 2.4 2.1 
2011 Stability Programmes, D-G Economic and Financial Affairs2 
Table 2 
Growth Rate of GDP in Eurozone as implied by SPs, Spring 2011 
         2011         2012       2013       2014 
1.7                   1.8 1.9 2.0 
                                                                                                    Table 1, AMECO 
However, by the end of 2011 it became clear that the SP growth rates for 2012 
were, or had become, completely unrealistic. Table 4 contrasts the SP forecasts 
for 2012 with the interim forecasts prepared by the Commission at the start of 
2012. Instead of continuing recovery the story is of return to recession. 
 
It is of course possible to interpret this divergence as merely a (large) forecasting 
error. But it can be argued, to the contrary, that the downturn is actually endogenous 
to the whole stability process, that it is the direct consequence of the austerity 
programmes promoted by that process throughout the E-zone. The Commission itself, 
as it revised its growth forecasts downwards in the autumn of 2011 wrote, “The 
downward revisions concern all the Member States under review, suggesting both a 
common factor and a re-coupling of growth dynamics.”   The common factor is of 
course the Commission's own fiscal consolidation drive. “Recoupling” suggests the 
end of the belief that drastic contractions in the periphery would not rebound on the 
Northern European economies (European Commission, 2011). 
 
 
 
 
Table 3 
Forecast and actual GDP growth, 
2011 
 SPs Outcome 
Belgium  2.0 1.9 
Germany  2.3 3.0 
Estonia  4.0 7.5 
Ireland  0.3 0.9 
Greece  -3.5 -6.8 
Spain  1.3 0.7 
France  2.0 1.7 
Italy  1.1 0.2 
Cyprus  1.5 0.5 
Luxembourg  3.2 1.1 
Malta  2.4 2.1 
Netherlands  1.8 1.2 
Austria  2.5 3.1 
Portugal  -2.2 -1.5 
Slovenia  1.8 0.3 
Slovakia  3.4 3.3 
Finland  3.6 2.7 
Euro Area 1.7 1.4 
                                   AMECO and 2011 SPs 
 
Table 4 
GDP growth 2012: SP and Commission 
forecasts autumn 2011 
 
SP Commission 
Belgium  2.3 -0.1 
Germany  1.8 0.6 
Estonia  4.0 1.2 
Ireland  2.0 0.5 
Greece  0.8 -4.4 
Spain  2.3 -1.0 
France  2.3 0.4 
Italy  1.3 -1.3 
Cyprus  2.5 -0.5 
Luxembourg  3.5 0.7 
Malta  2.3 1.0 
Netherlands  1.5 -0.9 
Austria  2.0 0.7 
Portugal  -1.8 -3.3 
Slovenia  2.2 -0.1 
Slovakia  4.8 1.2 
Finland  2.7 0.8 
Euro Area 1.8 -0.3 
European Commission 2011 and 2011 SPs 
 
Thus the medium term perspectives adopted in the SPs were totally obsolete within a 
few months and, as a consequence, the planned fiscal consolidations were bound to 
fail; government expenditures would be rather higher in a recession than with growth 
of 1.8% and tax receipts very much lower. 
 
It can also be shown that the pattern of growth assumed in the SPs was implausible. In 
each SP projected growth rates are broken into five components: net exports; gross 
fixed capital formation; inventories; private consumption and public consumption. 
The last of these was programmed to grow very slowly. The SPs make it possible to 
derive aggregate figures for government consumption, because they provide initial 
levels for 2010 and growth rates thereafter. (Initial levels are missing in the MoU for 
Portugal and in the German SP, where only an index number is given. These missing 
values have been taken from AMECO. The AMECO figures in general are slightly 
different from the figures in the SPs – in particular they are rather higher for the 
weaker economies. But in general the two sets of figures are very close.)  
 
Table 5 gives the aggregate growth of government consumption implied by the SPs. 
Because substantially higher expenditures are only planned in Belgium, Austria and 
Germany and even there spending is planned to grow much more slowly than GDP, 
overall government consumption as implied by the SPs is virtually static. Relative to 
eurozone GDP the total is programmed to fall from 19.9% to 18.8% over the four 
years. Recent AMECO data (July 2012) suggest that this squeeze on government 
consumption is being achieved: the eurozone total for 2011 was the same as in 2010, 
while projections are now for small declines in both 2012 and 2013.  
 
Table 5 
Government consumption expenditure 
 
level: € billion percentage change 
 
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Belgium  62.80 1.5 1.7 1.7 1.8 
Germany  488.80 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
Estonia  2.99 0.0 1.0 1.0 2.7 
Ireland  27.31 -3.0 -2.3 -2.2 -2.2 
Greece  33.50 -8.4 -4.0 -1.0 -0.3 
Spain  152.80 -1.3 -0.8 -0.6 -0.6 
France  469.80 0.0 -0.1 -0.2 0.0 
Italy  260.69 0.0 -0.2 0.5 0.7 
Cyprus  2.95 -0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Luxembourg  4.80 0.5 3.1 1.8 2.2 
Malta  0.93 1.4 -0.5 0.8 0.4 
Netherlands  167.80 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.3 
Austria  48.20 1.0 1.0 1.2 1.3 
Portugal  37.10 -8.8 -4.7 -1.2 1.2 
Slovenia  7.26 -0.8 -1.3 -1.5 -0.2 
Slovakia  8.80 -5.3 -0.1 -0.8 2.5 
Finland  44.20 1.2 0.6 0.9 0.4 
eurozone 1820.73 -0.1 0.9 0.3 0.5 
                                                                              2011 SPs, AMECO 
Meanwhile little growth is to be expected from private consumption while 
unemployment is high and consumers in many countries are affected by recession, 
over-indebtedness and declining housing wealth. Since the foreseeable swings in 
inventories are small over the medium term, the optimistic growth projections of the 
SPs have to rest on big increases in net exports and fixed investment. In both cases the 
implied aggregate performance of the eurozone seems very implausible. 
 
Unemployment 
 
The SPs for 2012 seem to have avoided the hopelessly over-optimistic projections of 
those of the previous year. If we consider now not GDP growth rates but 
unemployment rates, we can see that predictions for 2012 and 2013 coincide nearly 
exactly with the figures given by the Commission.  
 
Table 6 
Eurozone Unemployment Rates (%) 
 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Belgium  7.2 7.5 7.8 7.8 7.8 
Germany  5.8 5.4 5.2 5.0 5.0 
Estonia  12.5 11.5 9.6 8.7 8.7 
Ireland  14.4 14.3 13.6 12.8 12.8 
Greece  17.7 19.7 19.6 19.6 19.6 
Spain  21.6 24.3 24.2 23.4 23.4 
France  9.7 10.2 10.3 10.3 10.3 
Italy  8.4 9.3 9.2 8.9 8.9 
Cyprus  7.7 9.5 9.5 9.0 9.0 
Luxembourg  4.5 5.0 5.4 5.6 5.6 
Malta  6.5 6.4 6.3 6.3 6.3 
Netherlands  4.5 5.5 6.0 6.0 6.0 
Austria  4.2 4.6 4.8 4.7 4.7 
Portugal  12.7 14.6 14.1 13.2 13.2 
Slovenia  8.2 8.8 9.3 9.1 9.1 
Slovakia  13.5 13.8 13.7 13.5 13.5 
Finland  7.8 8.0 7.9 7.7 7.7 
eurozone 10.1 10.8 10.7 10.5 10.2 
                                                             2012 SPs6 
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 The country rates have been aggregated using labour force estimates from 2011. Greece did not 
submit a Stability Programme for 2011; the French 2012 SP gave no unemployment forecasts – 
  
  
The adoption of more plausible unemployment figures should not be taken to suggest 
that there is more coherence in the SPs of 2012 than I those of the previous year. Once 
again aggregation of the programme data has absurd implications for the eurozone as 
a whole. Of the 17 countries in the monetary union, 15 base their GDP growth figures 
on an increase in net exports. One of the two exceptions is Luxembourg, too small to 
absorb a significant amount of imports from other member states. The other is 
Germany, but there is no suggestion that Germany is about to move away from its 
huge trade surplus. After 2011, when more than a quarter of German GDP growth of 
3% was attributable to an increased trade surplus, Germany’s stability programme 
sees only a tiny move in the other direction in 2012 ( with exports growing by 2% 
against 3% growth in imports). Thereafter, trade will have a neutral impact on GDP 
growth with exports and imports increasing in step through 2016. Just as with the SPs 
for 2011, those for 2012 imply an implausibly large surge in eurozone net exports to 
the rest of the world.     
 
The 2012 SPs, however, are impressive for a different characteristic: they offer no 
prospect at all of a labour market recovery. If these programmes, submitted to and 
endorsed by EU leaders, are implemented in practice (which may itself be an 
excessively optimistic supposition) then the eurozone will continue to suffer 
unemployment rates in excess of 10% and there will be no change in the acute 
divergence between performance in the core and the periphery. 
 
Because the data used here are macroeconomic, it is not possible to make precise 
statements about specific groups. It is always the case that a general deterioration 
impacts most severely on the most vulnerable groups. In the present case, younger 
workers are particularly exposed; public sector payrolls are being drastically 
shortened and unavoidably this takes place mostly by freezing recruitment, locking 
out the young. Once again, a sharp divergence can be seen: some core economies, 
such as that of Germany, have managed to contain or even reduce youth 
unemployment while it has exploded in the periphery.  
 
Unemployment rates for the age group 15-24 tend to exaggerate the problem because 
those in full-time education are treated as inactive and this reduces the denominator of 
the calculation. Unemployment ratios, expressing unemployment as a percentage of 
the whole young population are biased in the other direction to the extent that 
educational courses are not chosen but merely used to avoid explicit payment of 
unemployment indemnities. Both sets of figures show that austerity in the heavily 
indebted countries is imposed at the expense of the young. Ratios above 10% are 
displayed by the “bailed-out” economies of Ireland, Greece and Portugal; the Spanish 
figure for 2011 was close to 20% (of the age-group, not just that part of the age-group 
not in school or college); the Baltic Republics and other post-soviet economies also 
show high values. The situation continues to deteriorate. In Greece, for example, the 
                                                                                                                                       
perhaps the impending presidential election is behind this inhibition. In both cases the missing data 
have been replaced by AMECO estimates for 2011-2013 while 2014 and 2015 values were put equal to 
those for 2013. The consequence is almost certainly to understate the overall unemployment levels 
implied by the SPs.  
unemployment rate for the 20-29 age group rose from 23.6% in 2010 to 33.7% in 
2011. 
 
The unemployment and youth unemployment of the eurozone should not be seen as 
simply reflecting a very adverse period in macroeconomic terms. The weak position 
of the peripheral economies is being used to drive through structural changes to their 
employment and wage-bargaining systems which will strengthen the position of 
employers on a permanent basis.   
  Table 7 
 
 
The Reform Programmes 
 
The national reform programmes (NRPs) submitted by member states are not subject 
to the same tight disciplinary control as the SPs: in most cases there is no question of 
sanctions. However, for the states where bail-out funds have been accepted the 
Commission’s recommendations may in fact be constraining because they represent 
formal or informal conditions on the supply of emergency finance. The discussion 
here will concentrate on the NRPs of Ireland, Greece and Portugal.7 
 
In principle, the reform programmes are guided by Europe2020, the broad strategy 
designed to replace the Lisbon agenda which supposedly guided the EU through the 
first decade of the present century. EU leaders have not yet admitted that the Lisbon 
agenda was a disastrous failure, but its employment targets were comprehensively 
missed: just prior to the outbreak of crisis the main employment gains achieved 
between 2000 and 2007, three quarters of the total eurozone employment growth, 
were concentrated in Italy, Spain, Ireland, Portugal and Greece; all more than wiped 
out subsequently. Meanwhile the drive for financial dregulation which was central to 
Lisbon and well summed up by the ambition of the Stockholm Council to make 
Europe the “cheapest place to do business in the world,” had contributed to EU banks’ 
enormous use of leverage (surpassing that of US banks) and their huge exposures to 
the sub-prime debacle.  
Just like its predecessor, Europe2020 includes environmental and social targets and 
lip service is paid to these in the NRPs. However, again like its predecessor its central 
thrust is to promote external competitiveness by the reinforcement of market 
pressures. Most of its social objectives are seen as following from a targeted increase 
in employment which would itself follow from the growth supposedly brought about 
by increased competitiveness. In the peripheral states this growth remains at present a 
mere supposition. 
It can be stressed firstly that the social situation in the peripheral states is particularly 
sensitive. The latest report from the annual report, The Employment and Social 
Situation in Europe, gives a ranking of EU member states in terms of poverty. At the 
top of the list are several East and Central European countries: Bulgaria, Romania, 
Latvia, Hungary, Lithuania and Poland where the rigours of post-soviet transition 
have resulted in many casualties. Immediately after, however, come Greece, Ireland 
and Portugal, where fiscal consolidation has already compromised national systems of 
social protection (European Commission, 2011b, p114).  The Commission’s repeated 
injunction to the governments concerned to “protect the vulnerable” should be read 
with this in mind. Leschke et al. (2012) confirm that retrenchment measures are most 
severe in the countries with the least adequate social protection systems. 
The general situation in the EU since the Single Act has been that economic policies 
are largely in the competence of the EU, social policies in that of the member states. 
(Certain aspects of labour market regulation, introduced at EU level, are the main 
exception to this generalisation but the EU’s legislative agenda in this field is now 
essentially finished.) Just because they have lost control over economic instruments – 
and because, in particular, the competition rules of  the EU make it difficult to use 
public procurement to adapt to the pressures of European integration and globalisation 
– member states have tended to guard most jealously their social policy autonomy. In 
Eurozone members, without monetary policy instruments, this problem of autonomy 
is more acute. 
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 In the case of Portugal the Memorandum of Understanding has been substituted for its 2011 NRP, as 
for its SP.  
The NRPs of the peripheral countries, written under immediate financial pressure, 
signal the loss of their remaining macroeconomic instrument, fiscal policy, and, at the 
same time, of any autonomy in social policy. The enforced imperatives are fiscal 
consolidation and competitiveness, the latter to be achieved by big reductions in real 
wages, welfare benefits and social services. In addition, the Commission insists on 
pushing forward its single market agenda by bringing state-level institutions and 
regulations into close accord with EU competition rules, although this may not be 
relevant to either the problem of public sector debt or that of current account deficits. 
 
The Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between the Commission, the IMF and 
Portugal establishes a complete programme of legislation, institutional change and 
regulatory reform between 2011 and 2014. The measures to be taken are specified in 
minute detail. The tight overall fiscal targets include specific targets for savings on 
both the expenditure and the revenue sides. In education, the government has to 
produce “savings” of € 195 million in 2012 and a further € 175 million in 2013. It is 
instructed in detail how to do this, for instance by “rationalising the school network” 
and “lowering staff needs.”  
 
Reforms in health care are more ambitious – they should lead to expenditure 
reductions of € 550 million in 2012, followed by € 375 million in 2013, in addition to 
reductions in health insurance provision for public sector employees. Most of these 
sums are to be obtained by squeezing expenditure on pharmaceutical products, the 
rest by rationalising and intensifying competition in the hospital sector. Some of these 
measures may be very justified but to impose them rather than permit the Portuguese 
themselves negotiate acceptable compromises may lead to big losses for particular 
interest groups and conflicts which result in new malfunctionsin the health care 
sector. 
 
“Efficiency savings” in public administration agreed in the MoU emphasise 
programmed dismissals and wage cuts. For example, management positions and 
administrative units are to be reduced by 15% over the life of the agreement; “annual 
decreases of 1% per year in headcounts of central administration and 2% in local and 
regional administrations”; “freeze wages in the government sector in nominal terms in 
2012 and 2013 and constrain promotions”; and so on. The degree of intrusion into 
Portuguese affairs is well illustrated by the programme for local government 
reorganisation in the MoU: “There are currently around 308 municipalities and 4,259 
parishes. By July 2012, the government will develop a consolidation plan to 
reorganize and significantly reduce the number of such entities. The Government will 
implement these plans based on agreement with EC and IMF staff. These 
changes,which will come into effect by the beginning of the next local election 
cycle,will enhance service delivery, improve efficiency, and reduce costs” (MoU, 
2011, p15). The implications for local democracy are not discussed. 
 
Pension indexation is to be suspended in 2012 and 2013, except for the very lowest 
pensions while pensions above € 1,500 are to be reduced; tax allowances for pension 
contributions are also to be reduced. These are only a few examples of detailed 
expenditure cuts in the MoU. 
 
Similarly, there are detailed prescriptions for revenue increases including the taxation 
of “all types of social cash transfers,” increases in VAT and excise duties and the 
imposition of excise duty on electricity. The MoU, however, does not stop there: it 
goes on to specify reforms and regulatory changes across every aspect of the 
Portuguese economy : the financial system; public-private partnerships and state-
owned enterprises (including a demand for privatisations); the structure and 
functioning of ministries and government agencies; the functioning of the courts; 
employment relations and the labour market; the educational system; transport; 
telecommunications; and much more.  
 
Many of the measures required have little or nothing to do with either fiscal 
consolidation or external competitiveness; they are simply opportunistic moves by the 
Commission to push through its single market agenda in a situation where there is 
little prospect of resistance. This is the case, for instance, with regulatory change in 
the professions and liberalisation of the mobile phone market. Indeed, some of these 
measures may delay correction of Portugal’s trade deficit by promoting import 
penetration in the services sector. 
 
Nevertheless, the MoU in general contains many threats to the Portuguese social 
model, in spite of repeated but vague injunctions to protect the most vulnerable. Only 
some examples will be given. The energy reforms aim at increases in the price of gas 
and electricity and the transport reforms at increased bus and train fares. The law of 
landlord and tenant is to be rewritten in favour of landlords (easier evictions and so 
on). Deregulation of postal services threatens the job security and working conditions 
of postal workers. Reform of working time regulations is to give more control to 
employers. Dismissals are to be facilitated. When such changes are considered 
together with the budgetary provisions discussed above it is clear that lower income 
groups in Portugal, including “the most vulnerable” face a dramatic deterioration in 
their living standards and in their level of social protection. 
 
The 2011 NRP for Greece follows the same logic as the Portugues MoU and the 
Troika’s prescriptions for the two counties differ only in points of detail. One aspect 
of the Greek case (also found in Portugal) is worth stressing – the strong pressure to 
decentralise wage bargaining. Greece, like many EU countries, has long practised the 
extension of collective agreements to employers outside the relevant industrial 
association. Where unions are relatively weak this is an indispensable protection of 
their status and it also protects the better employers from the worse ones. Under 
pressure from the troika the Greeks now propose to eliminate this practice, although 
conditions in the labour market are alreaady extremely adverse for employees. A 
series of other measures work in the same direction. The NRP admitted “Labour 
market outcomes are expected to remain weak this year and the next, with a faster 
rebound forecast for the second part of the upcoming decade” (Hellenic Republic, 
2011, p36). The next NRP, however, had to recognise that the situation had 
deteriorated even further (Hellenic Republic, 2012). The AMECO data base now 
projects falling employment in Greece into 2013. 
 
The Greek NRP for 2012 reports a drastic deterioration in working conditions: “Data 
from the Labour Inspectorate confirm the increasing use of flexible forms 
of employment in the Greek labour market, since, in 2011, 58,962 full time 
employment contracts have been converted into part time employment or rotation 
work. Compared to 2010, these increases are of 73.25% concerning part time 
employment, of 193.06% concerning rotation work with the consent of the employee, 
and of 631.89% concerning rotation work unilaterally by the employer. This shift 
towards flexible forms of employment can also be reflected in the share of full time 
employment contracts in the labour market, which from 79% in 2009, fell to 66.9% in 
2010 and to 58.92% in 2011. The latest available data from the Labour Inspectorate 
(January-February 2012) broadly confirm that the above mentioned trend still 
prevails.” 
 
Karamessini (2012) reports both an assault on individual workers’ rights and 
“changes in the wage-setting system aimed at defeating the unions, undoing collective 
bargaining and expanding individual bargaining in the private sector.” 
    
 
Intrusion into Ireland’s social model may be slightly less intense than in the cases of 
Greece and Portugal. However, the NRP specifies social security reforms aimed at 
putting downward pressure on the lowest wages: sanctions are tightened on the 
unemployed refusing a job and on one-parent family claimants. The following 
declaration in the NRP also sounds ominous for the low-paid: “An independent 
review has been undertaken of the continued relevance, fairness and efficiency of 
statutory wage setting mechanisms covering a range of low-paid sectors. An action 
plan will be developed in consultation with the European Commission Services, in 
line with the provision in the EU/IMF Programme, to ensure that these statutory 
mechanisms work effectively and efficiently and that they do not have a negative 
impact on economic performance and employment levels” (Ireland, 2011). 
 
There are positive aspects to the Irish NRPs. In particular, there appear to be 
strenuous interventions in response to rising unemployment. It reports, for example, 
that in the context of Ireland’s Employment Action Plan a very large number of 
training places and full-time university courses had been provided. However, it is 
clear that under financial pressure the government had virtually abandoned its anti-
poverty programme. Those in “consistent poverty” were estimated to be 4.2% of the 
population in 2008. The original target had been to reduce this substantially by 2012 
and eliminate consistent poverty by 2016. The NRP, however, recognises that things 
have been going backward: “The challenge of meeting the national poverty target is 
considerable, as indicated by the rise in the consistent poverty rate to 5.5% in 2009 
and it is possible that the rate may even be higher in 2010. The timescale for 
achieving the poverty target will be influenced by the pace at which economic and 
employment growth returns to the Irish economy. It is envisaged that in the early 
years fewer people may be lifted out of poverty or indeed the numbers may increase 
due to the effects of the economic recession and the implementation of the National 
Recovery Plan, in particular changes in the structure and operation of the social 
welfare system and child income support (as occurred in 2010 and 2011).” A review 
of the targets was to be undertaken, “to set out different levels of ambition for poverty 
reduction.” And indeed the 2012 NRP confirms that the target has been reduced. The 
Irish acknowledge here what is the general situation in the eurozone periphery and 
further afield – in response to the crisis of the euro fiscal consolidation and cost 
reductions take priority over social objectives. 
 
In other countries the danger to social models may not be as great but is still 
significant, both because of the very tight fiscal squeeze resulting from an 
uncoordinated macroeconomic stance and from the priority given to cost reductions 
by the Commission. One example is the possible consequences of fiscal consolidation 
for regional policy in Italy. The Italian NRP for 2011 (p15) reports that in the South 
the public sector provides 25% of employment against only 15% in the Centre and 
North. Clearly it will be difficult to avoid increased regional divergence in the context 
of a large-scale and rapid reduction in public spending.  
 
Only a selective survey of the NRPs has been undertaken here, concentrating on the 
“bail-out” member states which are under the greatest pressure for policy changes. 
But these examples suffice to show that the policy changes enforced in the weaker 
states threaten a profound disorganisation of their social models and a deterioration in 
the economic security and living standards of populations which are already among 
the most exposed to poverty. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Two main policy objectives are declared in the EU’s intervention into the weaker 
member states: reduction in public sector debt and the restoration of competitiveness. 
The first is to be addressed by fiscal consolidation, the latter by “internal 
devaluation,” that is, by reducing incomes. There is a serious tension between the two 
approaches. Fiscal consolidation certainly works to reduce incomes but lower 
incomes themselves aggravate the burden of indebtedness by making it harder to 
service the debt. The response of the Commission and the Troika to the resulting 
problems has been to chase induced effects downwards – calling for more austerity to 
reinforce fiscal consolidation. Only very recently have there been signs of a 
reappraisal of this position. 
 
EU social policy used to be more than a rhetorical device. The European Social Fund, 
today of vestigial significance, actually dates back to the European Coal and Steel 
Community, the first of the institutions which would become the EU. The purpose of 
the Fund was to compensate those who lost from economic integration. It effectively 
did so, its main early beneficiaries being Belgian miners. Under French pressure early 
European treaties promoted gender equality in labour markets. 
 
In the 1960s and 1970s the war against social dumping attempted to eliminate 
competition based on lax employment standards and inadequate social provision. No 
doubt it protected workers in the more successful economies; but it also encouraged 
the development of social protection in the more backward ones. 
 
Today it is scarcely an exaggeration to say that social dumping has become the actual 
social strategy of the EU, as the drive to restore competitiveness, that is, to reduce 
labour costs, by any means available has become the central component of a 
dogmatic, regressive and dysfunctional response to the crisis of public debt, a crisis 
itself largely attributable to the myopia and pusillanimity of EU and northern 
European leaderships. 
 
No doubt the best resolution would be a complete change of direction at EU level, a 
return to the construction of a genuinely social Europe. But populations under acute 
pressure are hardly to be criticised if, in the absence of a general reappraisal they seek 
to defend their societies by challenging the rules and the structures of the actually 
existing European Union.  
 
 
 
Note: Baltic Republics are not Model Pupils 
 
One occasionally comes across the suggestion that economic recovery in the Baltic 
Republics shows that internal devaluation and fiscal consolidation according to the 
troika’s prescriptions can be effective. Jeffrey Sommers and Michael Hudson 
(Financial Times, 25/6/12) refute this:  
“Austerity’s advocates depict Latvia as a plucky country that can show Europe the 
way out of its financial dilemma – by “internal devaluation”, or slashing wages. Yet 
few of the enthusiastic commentators have spent enough time in the country to 
understand what happened. Its government has chosen austerity, its people have not. 
Finding no acceptable alternative, much of the labour force has elected to emigrate. 
This is a major factor holding down its unemployment rate to “just” 15 per cent today. 
“Latvia is not a model for austerity in Greece or anywhere else. Both the impression 
that neoliberal policy has been a success and the claim that Latvians have voted to 
support this failed model are incorrect. 
“Latvia’s one year of solid economic growth since its economy plunged by 25 per 
cent in 2008-10 is billed as a success. Then, unemployment soared above 20 per cent 
as the shutdown of foreign capital inflows (mainly Swedish mortgage loans to inflate 
its real estate bubble) left Latvia with a deep current-account deficit. It had to choose 
between devaluation or maintaining the euro peg. 
“It chose the latter in order to proceed towards euro accession. To meet the eurozone 
criteria it cut public sector wages by 30 per cent, driving down overall wage levels 
and consumption to match its low labour productivity. The doctrine was that this 
shock therapy and poverty would soon restore prosperity. 
“What enabled Latvia to survive the crisis were EU and IMF bailouts – whose 
repayments will soon fall due. Relatively low public sector debt (9 per cent of gross 
domestic product at the start of the crisis) also provided some protection from bond 
traders. Latvia’s problem was mostly private sector debt, especially mortgage debt, 
which is secured not only by property but by the personal liability of entire families of 
joint signatories. The bank insurance agency insisted on this measure as it saw 
unaffordable housing prices being inflated by reckless bank lending. (Its job was to 
protect the banks, not the economy.) 
“The resulting austerity programme is anything but popular. Latvia’s parliament often 
polls approval ratings in the single-digits. Yet the government has survived two 
elections. How is one to read this? 
“Chiefly by ethnic politics. The biggest party opposing the austerity programme 
(Harmony Centre) largely represents ethnic Russians and had no chance of winning 
given its focus on rights for Russian speakers. The smaller parties run by post-Soviet 
oligarchs also are seen as being in league with Russia and are widely resented for 
fiscal imprudence during the boom years, when oligarch-controlled parties were part 
of the governing coalition. So the only political force left is the “austerians”. While 
most voters dislike their economic policy, a majority are convinced that they are best 
able to resist Russia’s embrace. All other issues come a distant second for Latvian 
voters. 
“That said, Latvians have protested against austerity. In January 2009, in the dead of 
winter, 10,000 protested in Riga. Teachers, nurses and farmers held demonstrations of 
their own. The police were called to suppress protests over the closure of a hospital. 
After these protests subsided, Latvians resigned themselves and began to emigrate. 
Demographers estimate that 200,000 have left in the past decade – nearly 10 per cent 
of the population – at an accelerating rate that reflects the austerity being inflicted. 
“Why have so many left Latvia if it is such an economic success, with such popular 
support for austerity as the advocates claim? Birth rates fell during the crisis – as is 
the case almost everywhere austerity programmes are imposed. Only now is Latvia 
seeing the social effects of austerity. It has among Europe’s highest rates of suicide 
and of road deaths caused by drink driving. Crime is high because of prolonged 
unemployment and police budget cuts. There is less accessible, lower-quality 
education and there is a soaring brain drain alongside blue-collar emigration. 
“The moral for Europeans is that a Latvian economic and political model can work 
only temporarily, and only in a country with a population small enough (a few 
million) for other nations to absorb émigrés seeking employment abroad. Such a 
country should be willing to have its population decline, especially its prime working-
age cohort. In Greece, this could only worsen an already serious demographic 
challenge. 
“Politically, it helps to be a post-Soviet economy with a fully flexible, poorly 
unionised labour force. Above all, the population needs to put an almost blind faith in 
“free market” central planners. Ethnic divisions can distract voters from complaints 
against austerity. Only under these political conditions can austerity be considered a 
‘success’.” 
Sommers and Hudson are also contributors to the forthcoming book by Routledge 
Press: The Contradictions of Austerity: The Socio-Economic Costs of the Neoliberal 
Baltic Model. 
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